Market Segmentation and Regional Economic Growth by Zhitao, SONG
101 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
ISSN 1923-841X[Print]
ISSN 1923-8428[Online]
www.cscanada.net
www.cscanada.org
International Business and Management
Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012, pp. 101-104
DOI:10.3968/j.ibm.1923842820120401.Z4R085
Market Segmentation and Regional Economic Growth
SONG Zhitao1,*
1Shandong Polytechnic University, Jinan, Shandong, 250100, China,
*Corresponding Author.
Address: Sangyuan Road 58# Licheng district Jinan city Shandong 
province China
Email: forest6688@126.com
Received 10 December 2011; Accepted 25 January 2012
Abstract 
Market segmentation has the institutional quality. This 
paper analyses the impact of market segmentation on 
regional economic growth from the aspect of institutional 
economic theory. This paper analyses the long and short 
relationship between market segmentation and regional 
economic growth from property protection, government 
efficiency and incentive mechanism. We conclude that, 
in the short run, market segmentation can promote the 
regional economic growth; but in the long run, it will 
decrease the regional economy.
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Market segmentation means that in a united country, 
it hasn’t built up a united market. In China, market 
segmentation is the result of institutional arrangement. 
The local governments in China exists administrative 
monopoly, governments compete with each other 
under the guidance of economic performance, which 
bring out market segmentation. The research on the 
relationship between local economic performance 
and market segmentation has been abundant. Lu and 
Chen(2009) thought that market segmentation affects 
local economic performance with a inverse U shape. 
At the beginning, market segmentation can promote 
the economic growth, but as the time goes, it will 
hinder the economic growth. Liu and Liu (2010) 
thought that market segmentation always hinder the 
economic growth. All of these researches are empirical 
researches, but the theory of the phenomenon is scarce. 
This paper is gonging to do the work to make up the 
defi ciency of the theory research.
1.  THE INSTITUTION QUALITY OF 
MARKET SEGMENTATION
The reason why the market segmentation built up is the 
institution of fiscal decentralization. Under the fiscal 
decentralization regime, the local government has its 
own interests, and the local government has the right of 
discretion. So the local government has more power than it 
has in theory. In order to get more fi scal income, promote 
local economic growth, the local government has the 
enthusiasm to protect local economy, and then it produced 
market segmentation. But at the same time the central 
government has the greatest power in administration and 
personnel appointment. So when the local government’s 
officials’ promotion is associated with economic 
performance, it will certainly make the local government 
compete with each other under the GDP growth type 
‘promotion championship’. In competition, the local 
interest is different and it will do harm to coordination 
and cooperation. He and Wang (2007) thought that the 
political championship underlying moral hazard and 
adverse selection, it can enhance the competition between 
local governments but it can also prejudice cooperation. 
Under the guidance of GDP competition, the local 
government became the main impellor to segment the 
market. Li, Qiu and Sun used the two stage game theory 
model to find out that, the inner trade protection is the 
main reason of domestic market segmentation. Yu (2009) 
put forward a new concept of regional administrative 
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monopoly to demonstrate the place protection and market 
segmentation. He thought that the start point of market 
segmentation is institution.
We can conclude from the existing literature that 
market segmentation has the quality of institution, the 
mechanism of its emergence and lasting are based on the 
institution.
2. THE EXPLANATION OF MARKET 
SEGMENTATION BRING ECONOMIC 
GROWTH
2.1 The Impact of Institution to Economic Growth
North and Thomas (1971), North (1981) ’s research 
provided a new regime to explain the reason of economic 
growth, and the scholars began to study how the institution 
impacts economic growth. North thought, the institution 
depends on the property and ideology. He pointed that 
some scholars ascribe the growth to labor force, capital 
and technology, but the key point in economic growth 
is not whether it can catch enough capital or technology 
but whether it has the right incentive mechanism so as to 
use the capital and technology correctly. In the views of 
the institutional economics, the neoclassical economic 
school’s growth factors are not the reason of growth, but 
just the performance of growth. One country’s judicial 
system and property protection system is the reason 
of growth. Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) thought that 
the economic growth depends on two conditions: good 
technology and good institution arrangement. And the 
gap between the developing countries and developed 
countries is mainly because of the developed countries has 
more advantages in government efficiency and property 
protection. A good institution arrangement can assure the 
contract be carried out, and decrease the transaction cost 
enhance the transaction effi ciency.
2.2 The Incentive Mechanism in Segmentation
In the view of institution arrangement, China has not 
established perfect judicial system and property right 
protection system. That is to say, in pure institution 
quality, China’s institution arrangement can not drive 
economic growth well. But in this relative bad institution 
arrangement, China has already got amazing GDP growth, 
and created a miracle. We can find the answer from the 
institution economy. North always emphasize that the most 
important factor to drive the economic growth is whether 
we can provide a good incentive mechanism. And the 
value of institution is just to provide the right incentive. In 
China’s reform and open policy, although it didn’t provide 
a good institution, it provided a “right” incentive. And the 
mechanism of this incentive is to give the motivation to 
the local government to put more power into the economic 
growth, and the evaluation of local economic performance 
will determine the officials’ own promotion. In order to 
get a higher position, the local governments compete with 
each other in economic growth. In this process, market 
segmentation is a byproduct of politics championship, and 
it is with the aspiration of local government. So market 
segmentation stand for an incentive which drive the 
economic growth.
2.3 Property Rights Protection Under Market 
Segmentation
North has been always praising the fully market-
oriented institution arrangement, emphasizing the value 
of private property rights for economic growth. But 
in fact, from the developing process of China, Japan 
and South Korea, we can see that the government 
oriented market economy has a lot to do with the 
common property rights. Especially in China, the local 
government is a big force not allowed to ignore. So 
North once said, although the initial political-economic 
structure is different, the followed changing improved 
the function of the government. Lu and Chen (2005) 
thought that the local government affected the economic 
growth in two ways, one is the force consistent with the 
market which leads to market integration and industrial 
cluster; while the other is the force inversed to the 
market which lead to market segmentation. These two 
forces built the economic condition of China nowadays.
Property rights protection and government efficiency 
are important foundation for economic growth. The 
traditional views of economic growth tell us that without 
formal property rights protection, economic growth will 
defi nitely be blocked. But China is an obvious exception. 
Although there is no formal property rights protection 
system, under the situation of market segmentation, local 
governments play the role of informal property rights 
protector. Zhou (2007) thought that political championship 
provided the property rights protection and made the 
policy environment good. The political championship 
is a special incentive mechanism for property rights 
protection, and it is the substitute of formal property 
rights protection. That is to say, in the situation of market 
segmentation, the local governments have the enthusiasm 
to provide a special property rights protection. And the 
protection provided by the governments is better and more 
effi cient than the formal institution in a sense.
In one word, market segmentation provided an 
institution arrangement, which can be more effi cient than 
that provided by the market. Although it is an informal 
institution, it played an important role fully. And it also 
brings about China economic growth and creates the 
miracles of China.
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3 .  T H E  B O U N D A RY O F  G R O W T H 
B R O U G H T  O U T  B Y  M A R K E T 
SEGMENTATION 
The problem is whether market segmentation can make 
the growth sustainable. The growth of this kind is just 
a temporary phenomenon or a sustainable situation is 
deserved to think about.
3.1 Market Segmentation and “North Paradox”
The North paradox of institutional economy thought 
that the state is the key element of economic growth, 
but meanwhile, it is also the source of decline. Market 
segmentation is one form of local protections, it stands 
for the degree of governments intervening in the economy 
in the essence. A powerful government can improve the 
growing speed of economy in particular time, but it can 
not solve the problems of coordination and it can not 
build a creative modern society either. At the beginning 
of China’s reform and opening period, economic 
development level is low, and the elements of economic 
growth are in the state of silent. So the government 
oriented economic growth type was in the state of 
efficiency increasing stage, and the government had 
no conflict of benefit with the people. The government 
has more benefit in common than in contradiction. That 
was because at that time, there was little interest in our 
society and the problems of producing was the focus for 
both the government and the people. The government 
played a good role of economic growth in that time. 
But as the economy developing, the efficiency of 
government began to decrease, the negative infl uence of 
government’s interfering to the economy became clear. 
When distribution problems became the focus, the effect 
of the government became inversed. When the incentives 
drive people to grab not to create, the governments 
have transferred themselves from the “helping hand” to 
“grabbing hand”. And the society would definitely fall 
to the bottom. At this time, the market segmentation 
will obviously hinder the economic growth, not as it has 
promoted the economic growth before. At the other side, 
market segmentation stands for the style of government 
manipulating economy, but from the views of history, 
the rulers always have the motivation to abuse of power, 
so as to grab more interest from defi ning property rights. 
The market segmentation brings conflict with local 
government and people and gives bad effect to economy 
and society development. The economy cannot realize a 
long term steady growth.
3.2 Market Segmentation and Market Scale
Edward Shils thought that constitute and sustain a unifi ed 
social need three elements, that is, unifi ed market, unifi ed 
culture and unified political authority. Has any hands 
of these three elements been impaired, the unity of the 
society weakened. Market segmentation is a factor that 
can block the unity of market, which will do harm to 
the economic of scale. The relationship between market 
scale and economic growth is deep. North once ascribed 
the industrial revolution to the enlargement of market 
scale. The enlargement of market scale caused the 
emergence of customary law, which leads to organization 
changes. Meanwhile, market scale pushed forward the 
division of labor, and decreased the cost of technological 
transformation, which could improve the technological 
efficiency, and put the technology forward. Technology 
is the most important side of economic growth. If the 
market segmentation blocked the technology progress 
by blocking the market scale, it would produce negative 
infl uence to long term economic performances.
From the analysis above, we can conclude that market 
segmentation can bring about economic growth, but the 
growth has a boundary. Due to the incentive mechanism 
and market scale, market segmentation cannot drive the 
economy into the process of continuous growth, but just 
lead it growth to a certain position, and then it will block 
the economic growth.
CONCLUSION
Although market segmentation has the mechanism 
to promote the economic growth, it  also has the 
mechanism to block the long-term steady growth. And 
these mechanisms have significant time effect, that is it 
can drive the economy grow well at the beginning, but 
has obvious negative influence latter. The relationship 
between market segmentation and economic growth is an 
inverted “U” shape. 
So, for countries like China, as the economy growths, 
the barriers between regions should be erased gradually, 
eliminate market segmentation ,build unifi ed commodity 
market and factor market so as to make resources across 
the country get reasonable and effective confi guration. At 
the same time perfect property rights protection institution 
should be built to substitute the local governments’ 
protection hands, and the right incentive mechanism 
should also be established to diminish the negative 
infl uence of local protection and market segmentation.
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